policy evaluations. In a recent article in the University of Chicago Law Review, Robert
Frank and Cass Sunstein proposed a relatively simple method for adding distributional concerns to policy evaluation that enlarges the typically constructed estimates of the individual's willingness to pay for safer jobs or safer products. We show that when considering the core of the Frank and Sunstein proposal carefully one concludes that current regulatory evaluations should be left alone because there is no reason to believe that relative positional effects are important either to personal decisions in general or to currently constructed cost-benefit calculations of government regulations in particular.
We argue that the most important refinements one could make in the area of regulatory evaluation would be for agencies involved to adhere more to the framework of what is generally considered a carefully done cost-benefit study, and for agencies to make greater actual use of appropriately done cost-benefit studies when recommending regulations. letters and other efforts to reform the regulatory process will be successful depends ultimately on how one values the benefits and costs of the regulations. Frank and Sunstein (2001) propose that benefit estimates used to value lives in regulatory studies, such as the ones OIRA seeks to promulgate, be increased. Their rationale for enlarging benefit calculations is that, as currently constructed, benefit estimates do not account for the role of people's concern over relative economic position in society. We argue against replacing the current approach to valuing risks to life and health because there is little evidence that relative position is important to individual decisions and even if it were policy decisions involving cost-benefit calculations would not change.
In the absence of explicit legislative prohibition, a comparison of costs to outcomes coupled with economic balancing is now the default standard when formulating a new government regulation (Sunstein 2000) . Cost-outcome balancing means weighing the policy's benefits and costs. Although studies of programs' costs and outcomes have been deservedly criticized for lack of completeness, Executive Order 12866 makes agencies provide a regulatory impact evaluation if a rule or regulation may "have an annual effect on the economy of $100 million or more or adversely affect in a material way the economy, a sector of the economy, productivity, competition, jobs, the environment, public health or safety, or State, local, or tribal governments or communities." (Hahn et al. 2000) . Similar intent that costs and outcomes be considered explicitly appears in the Unfunded Mandates Act of 1995. In what may have a dampening effect on cost and benefit comparisons in decision making, at least in the private sector, juries seem to punish private sector firms that try to balance costs and benefits of harm to customer or worker health when making production decisions prior to accidents and ultimate tort suits (Viscusi 2001) . Still, where government regulations are concerned, no longer is the debate mostly over whether to consider costs and benefits but rather more over what belongs in the cost and benefit columns.
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Frank and Sunstein offer a simple solution to the thorny issue of how to incorporate non-uniform net benefits across initially advantaged versus disadvantaged groups when calculating net benefits of a regulation. We argue that there are conceptual and practical flaws to the modest proposal of Frank and Sunstein so that producers and users of studies of regulatory cost and outcomes should not adopt their idea. Rather, we should retain the current approach of using absolute benefit values rather than benefit values adjusted for relative economic position.
Current Practice
As currently practiced, analysis of the benefits of risk reduction typically relies on multivariate statistical estimates of what a worker is implicitly willing to accept to incur risks on the jot or what a consumer is implicitly willing to pay for a safer product.
Estimates of such risk-money tradeoffs underlie the estimated benefits of saving a statistical life, known either as the implicit value of life or the value of a statistical life.
These concerns also underlie the estimated benefits of preventing certain non-fatal injuries, sometimes referred to as the implicit value of harm. Government regulations mandating greater safety will lower wages and raise product prices so that the ultimate costs of the safety enhancements are paid for by the end users of the safety, workers and consumers. The change in wages or prices then reveals the value of a regulation-induced safety enhancement to compare to cost calculations in a cost-benefit analysis.
The standard procedure, then, used to calculate benefit values for a government program is the amount society is willing to pay for the program's benefits. In the case of risk regulation the reference point is our willingness to pay for the risk reduction that was achieved by the regulation. In the case of policies that save lives the question is not how much people are willing to pay for the particular outcomes in terms of actual lives saved, but how much people are willing to pay for reductions in the risk to life for a much broader population group.
To establish meaningful values for the tradeoffs people are willing to make between risk and money, economists have focused on choices people make in the marketplace. A chief source of information has been estimates from the labor market.
Using large data sets on worker behavior, one can estimate the incremental wages workers receive in return for facing added risk, controlling for other aspects of the worker's job. The wage increment approach yields an implicit value of life in the range of $3 million to $7 million for most studies in the literature. 2 For the sake of convenience, we will take a midpoint value of about $5 million as indicating an appropriate value of a statistical life based on market wage-risk tradeoffs. So, if workers faced an annual job fatality risk of one chance in 10,000, an implicit value of life of $5 million implies that each worker would require an extra $500 to face the added 1/10,000 risk of death. Put somewhat differently, if there were 10,000 workers affected, each of whom faced a job risk of one chance in 10,000, then there would be one expected statistical death to the group. In return for facing the 1/10,000 risk there would be an extra wage premium of $500 for each of the 10,000 workers, or a total of $5 million more paid in wages.
Implicitly, the group of workers are willing to exchange total compensation of $5 million to accept the extra risk of one statistical death to their group, which gives rise to the value of a statistical life of $5 million. We will refer to estimates of extra group compensation as absolute value of life figures.
Practitioners of cost-benefit analysis have assembled several panels of experts to make recommendations for what a well-formulated cost-benefit comparison should contain in the areas of the environment, health, and medicine with the goal of increasing realism and transparency of calculations and decisions to be drawn (Gold et al. 1996; Arrow et al. 1996) . A common concern for cost-benefit analysis is that distribution of costs and benefits by, say, income or race should not be ignored when reporting and applying cost-benefit analysis. If two policies have the same total costs and total benefits one might argue on equity grounds that the policy that does more for the poor should be 2 For a review of the evidence, see Viscusi 1998, especially The essential reason for our claim is that people care a great deal about their relative economic position, and not solely, and often not mostly, about their absolute economic position. Current estimates tell us what an individual, acting in isolation, would be willing to pay for, say, an increase in safety on the job. But when an individual buys additional safety in isolation, he experiences not only an absolute decline in the amounts of other goods and services he can buy, but also a decline in his relative living standards. In contrast, when a regulation requires all workers to purchase additional safety, each worker gives up the same amount of other goods, so no worker experiences a decline in relative living standards. If relative living standards matter, then an individual will value an across-the-board increase in safety more highly than an increase in safety that he alone purchases. 
Conceptual Issues and Contradictory Evidence
In many cases the devil is in the details. anecdotes are a large data set and one anecdote is a small data set, a brief story is in order. One of us once worked during the summer in a chemical plant. Everyone in the plant knew that working in the acid production department was much more dangerous than working in the sodium production department. Most butchers we have met have part of at least one finger missing and most roofers we have met have a broken back of varying degrees of severity. One need not have the same reference group for safety as for residual consumption either. 6 Workers do know their relative workplace safety, so it is difficult to accept safety in the workplace as a totally non-positional good.
We contend that if income remaining after one implicitly purchases more safety or health affects the feeling of well-being indirectly via the relative ability to purchase fewer other things, then a regulation also makes one better off because the additional safety or health is not only absolute but also relative to a reference group. Safety or health may also be positional so that I get additional well-being from being safer than my neighbors or colleagues. If it seems reasonable for one to care about how his or her consumption of non-safety things compares to the consumption of others, then it also seems reasonable that one should care about how his or her consumption of safety and health compares to others' safety and health. The two positional effects may then simply cancel. The supplemental welfare effect of moving up the safety ladder can cancel the supplemental welfare effect of moving down the consumption of all other things ladder, and we are back to the familiar case where only the absolute levels of safety and residual income come into play.
One source of evidence regarding countervailing positional effects where health is concerned is revealed by the relationship between income and the desire for health insurance. As people get richer, do they have greater desire to purchase health insurance to protect their health? The evidence here is quite strong. Economic estimates suggest that as one's income increases by some percentage, the demand for health insurance also increases but at roughly half that rate. 7 The observed relationship between income and the desire to protect one's health suggests to us that workers are concerned not only with their income position but also with their health position in society. conjectures is that experimental situations premised on an economic falsehood will not be taken at face value by respondents. People will realize that in World A, where they earn just under half of what everybody earns, the prices of goods and services will be bid up and they will be less well off than if their earnings are greater than everyone else's.
Including the disclaimer that income figures represent real purchasing power does not overcome the underlying difficulty that the disclaimer is an economic falsehood. The equal purchasing power disclaimer will not be fully credible to experimental student subjects who realize the importance of their income within the context of the income of other people in giving them access to goods and services in our economy. indicated that he or she is very happy if there is a good functioning well and an outhouse in close proximity. However, having the two amenities from the year 1800 today would probably not make one feel "very happy."
In much the same way, studies regarding what budget is needed to obtain some minimum comfort level or "to get along in this community" are also likely to be influenced by the current standard of living. 14 People's life expectancy was less 50 or 100 years ago, and many of the products we now purchase on a mass scale, such as a telephone or a television, were formerly restricted to a narrow band of relatively wealthy consumers. What we need "to get along in this community" necessarily changes with the to buy an extra value meal every week at McDonalds but will not buy a Rolex watch, a BMW, or any of the other status symbols that one can flaunt to demonstrate one's higher economic status. The point is that one does not buy much extra relative consumption for accepting a job that is two or three times more dangerous than the average job.
Finally, the Frank and Sunstein maintained proposition, that positional effects are important to evaluating willingness to pay and attendant regulatory benefits, is flawed with respect to their attribution of the relevant reference group. As is indicated by the quote above, Frank and Sunstein believe that if all workers are required to purchase additional safety, then there will not be a positional effect. Only when an individual worker must have greater job safety is relative position consequential, so that regulatory policies will supposedly not be subject to the positional evaluation bias that affects market tradeoffs. However, safety policies in the United States are not financed by general revenues in which costs are spread across the entire society. If there is a government regulation of, for example, the risks of explosion in a grain elevator, then the regulation will boost the costs to the firm and will be borne, at least in part, by other workers at the firm because the regulation can raise the price of the product and reduce sales and the firm's subsequent demand for workers. The neighbors of the grain elevator workers who perhaps work for a construction firm or the highway department will not be affected by the costs of the grain elevator safety regulation. Only the grain elevator's workers will incur the major share of the regulatory costs. In the case of the typical regulation just described there will still be the economic status effects that concern Frank and Sunstein. Only when everybody in society shares in a regulation's cost will there be no positional reshuffling. How a regulation's cost must be shared for there not to be a positional effect is unclear. We do not know whether it is the absolute cost amount that should be equalized across people or whether it should be a proportional effect on their income, or some other formula in order to ensure positional neutrality.
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It Will Not Matter Anyway
Let us come at the issue of positionality in cost-benefit analysis from the perspective of persons outside the Ivory Tower who use and defend cost-effectiveness calculations. Frank and Sunstein contend that income position matters in addition to income level where individual well-being is calculated and then linked to safety. They suggest a 50 per cent add factor on the value of life estimates currently in play. A second anecdote is in order. One of us spent a year in the private sector doing cost-effectiveness studies in a major drug company where there is much financial incentive to discover defensible arguments for increasing the benefits of a health enhancing pharmacotherapy.
Even in an environment as profit-oriented as a drug company it would be impossible to use made-up examples of Smith and Jones (pp. 348-351) and introspection (pp. 352-353) to convince senior managers that the company could justify increasing the benefit of the intervention by half. No one on the cost-benefit analysis firing line is going to cite thought experiments or a comparison of pay and performance in three selected occupations (pp. 361-363) as justification for changing benefit calculations as typically 16 An additional complexity is that the individual's reference group cannot be uniquely identified in econometric models of individual outcomes (Manski 1993 , Moffitt 2001 ). The reason is that possible reference groups are nested inside each other. Suppose that we consider the effects of others' incomes on my behavior and that my true reference group is only my neighbor living in the house to the east. The researcher cannot know that only the income of one neighbor enters my decisions, so that a statistical model incorrectly attributing my reference group as all the houses on my block will find that the average income on my block is statistically significant to my behavior because incomes are positively correlated across houses nearby.
done. Multivariate statistical evidence of the extent of any positional effects in income will be needed.
The only study of even tangential relevance available on possible welfare effects of relative income position is a Dutch study by van de Stadt, Kapteyn, and van de Geer (1985) that . Without commenting on the quality of the statistical model or the generalizability of the results, let us simply note that Users of statistical results concerning human behavior usually consider not only the estimated average outcome but also a range of possible outcomes based on theoretical considerations or on the expected precision of the estimated average outcome (Krantz 1999) . Incorporating the statistical accuracy of an estimate means that policy evaluations regularly consider a range of outcomes rather than just the best single estimate of the outcome. An obvious way to create a range of benefits for a regulation, for example, is to create a pessimistic outcome that is the estimated average benefit of the regulation minus 2 or 3 times the measured imprecision in the estimated average benefit (standard error)
and an optimistic outcome that is the estimated average benefit plus 2 or 3 times the measure of imprecision in the average.
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Now suppose we consider a well-known estimate of the value of a statistical life as it applies to job safety and its associated measure of imprecision (Thaler and Rosen 1975) care in producing cost benefit studies that adhere to currently accepted practices as discussed and described in Gold et al. (1996) and Hahn et al. (2000) as well as greater agency adherence to the implications of the estimated benefits and costs when setting regulatory policy as discussed and described in Sunstein (2000) .
Evaluation That Considers Distribution of Outcomes
The issue of evaluating distributional equity in costs and effects of government intervention is like the old saying about the weather, "Everyone complains about it but nobody does anything about it." Just as scientists do not have the technology to change the weather, empirical researchers have not generally had the statistical tools to do justice to understanding the distributional consequences of state intervention in behavior while examining the average overall effect. The good news is that things are changing, and
19 See Breyer 1993. elegant statistical techniques have started to appear that produce empirically robust conclusions about cost and benefit distribution consequences (DiNardo, Fortin, and Lemieux 1996; Heckman, Smith, and Clements 1997; Heckman and Smith 1998; Heckman 2001; and DiNardo and Tobias 2001) . The bad news is that even the most transparent of the statistical techniques for understanding distribution issues are still a long way from being put into widespread use because of their complexity.
As alluring as the Frank and Sunstein attempt to introduce simply the distribution of outcomes into the typical cost-benefit calculation is, there are good reasons not to do it their way. Our basic objection to enlarging the benefits side of the typical cost-benefit analysis based on the concerns of Frank and Sunstein is that there may be countervailing positional effects stemming from the distribution of the benefit. One's drive for status will include a concern with health and the risk of death or disability, not just income. An additional flaw in the Frank and Sunstein argument is that they do not consider the usual statistical practice that when judging an estimate of, say, an average, the true mean could be higher or lower than the sample average. Moreover, boosting value of life measures as they recommend will have little consequential effect on policy evaluations.
Despite the obvious sensitivity of assigning a value to risks to life, the use of value of life calculations to value policy benefits has become standard practice throughout the government. What accounts for this widespread adoption of the method?
In our view the fact that the estimates are based on real market data for life and death choices rather than hypothetical thought experiments is a major contributing factor.
Moreover, given the sensitivity of the concerns, it is noteworthy that absolute value of life estimates are derived from the value workers themselves place on risks of death as reflected in their labor market decisions. The Frank and Sunstein adjustments are based on hypothetical experiments and happiness surveys in the Netherlands and elsewhere for which the link to how people value risks to their life is much less transparent. how a small decrease in one's income implicit in purchasing a reduction in risk will affect one's position on the economic status treadmill. However, we find no compelling evidence that the quest for economic status should lead to any adjustment in the value of life currently used in policy evaluations
